Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
1982

The Right of Confrontation: Part I
Paul C. Giannelli

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal
Procedure Commons

Repository Citation
Giannelli, Paul C., "The Right of Confrontation: Part I" (1982). Faculty Publications. 442.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/442

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

p

I

T

Vol. 5, No.3

May-June 1982

THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
Part I
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University

t

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." This clause was held binding upon the
states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In
addition, the right of confrontation is recognized in
virtually all state constitutions. See 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (listing
authorities). For example, the Ohio Constitution
provides: "In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person ... [and] to meet the witnesses face to
face .... " The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has
shown no inclination to interpret the Ohio provision so as to afford greater confrontation protection than that required by the Sixth Amendment.
See State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d
1122 (1981); State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322,
415 N.E.2d 272 (1980).
The U.S. Supreme Court has underscored the importance of the Confrontation Clause on numerous
occasions. In an early case, Kirby v. U.S., 174 U.S.
47 (1899), the Court referred to the confrontation
clause as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of
life and liberty ... long deemed so essential for
the due protection of life and liberty that it is
guarded against legislative and judicial action by
provisions in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of most if not all the
States composing the Union." /d. at 55-56. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("There
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court
and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an
essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."). Because the right of confrontation is
considered such a fundamental right, it has often
been applied as an element of due process in
noncriminal proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hear-

ings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare
termination hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearings; conditional right of confrontation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearings;
conditional right); Willner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of
admission to bar); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959) (security clearance revocation).
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of
the Confrontation Clause, its scope as well as the
values it seeks to protect remain subject to debate. This result is probably attributable to two
factors. First, as Justice Harlan has pointed out,
"the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause," California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (concurring opinion).
See also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 104 (1972) ("The
historical approach is peculiarly difficult as applied to the Sixth Amendment because a satisfactory history of the right of confrontation has yet to
be written."). Second, the Supreme Court has only
recently ventured into this area. The Court "decided its first confrontation case a century after the
Sixth Amendment was adopted." /d. Moreover, the
Court had little need to develop a comprehensive
view of the right of confrontation prior to 1965,
when the right was first applied to state trials in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Prior to that
time, the Court could resolve most "confrontation"
issues on federal evidentiary grounds.
This article will examine the current status of
the Confrontation Clause. The first part of the article considers the "right to be present," the right of
cross-examination, and Bruton issues. The second
part discusses the relationship between the right
of confrontation and the hearsay rule.
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PRESENCE AT TRIAL

ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." /d. at 19, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). The court rejected this argument, which
would have required a defendant to have been advised in advance of the consequences of absenting himself from trial. According to the Court, "[i]t
is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner ...
entertained any doubts about his right to be present at every stage of his trial." /d. at 20.
Several courts have also found a "waiver" where
the defendant absents himself prtor to trial but after arraignment. See U.S. v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1975). cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v.
U.S., 424 U.S. 925 (1976); U.S. v. Tortora, 464 F.2d
1202 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub. nom., Santora
v. U.S., 409 U.S.1063 (1972).
The right to be present has been codified in Federal Criminal Rule 43 and Ohio Criminal Rule 43.
See generally BB Moore's Federal Practice ch. 43
(1981); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal
Law, Grim. R. 43 (1980). See also R.C. 2945.16
(right to be present at jury view); Grim. R. 15 (right
to be present at deposition).

"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed
by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right
to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970);
accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v.
U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("A leading principle
that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure
is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be
done in the absence of the prisoner."). See also
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 567, 569-74 (1978). Thus, it is a violation of the right of confrontation for the defendant
to be absent during challenges to the jury, lewis v.
U.S., 146 U.S. 370 (1892), during the introduction of
evidence, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 370 (1948), and
when additional jury instructions are given, State
v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87, 19 N.E.2d 645 (1939);
Jones v. State, 26 Ohio St. 208 (1875).
A recent case involving the right to be present is
U.S. v. Benefield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In
Benefield a videotape deposition of the prosecution's principal witness, a kidnap victim, was taken
prior to trial. The deposition was used because the
witness' psychiatrist testified that her "psychiatric
problems were directly related to her abduction.
He recommended that she not be required to testify or that circumstances less stressful than a trial
courtroom be arranged." /d. at 817. The defendant
was excluded from the room in which the deposition was taken, although he did observe the proceedings on a monitor and could interrupt the proceedings by using a buzzer, at which time his
counsel could consult with him. The Eighth Circuit
found this procedure infringed the defendant's
right of confrontation:

RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
In addition to ensuring a defendant's right to be
present, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant the right to cross-examine the "witnesses against him." See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the [Confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.").
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("a denial of
cross-examination without a waiver ... would be
constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would
cure it.").
Denial of Right to Cross-Examine
The Supreme Court has reviewed several cases
in which it has found a complete denial of the
right of cross-examination. For example, in
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the prosecution called a previously-convicted accomplice
as a witness. When the witness refused to testify,
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination,
the prosecutor read the witness' prior confession
which implicated the defendant, under the guise of
refreshing the witness' recollection. The Supreme
Court reversed.

Basically the confrontation clause contemplates the
active participation of the accused at all stages of the
trial, including the face-to-face meeting with the witness at trial or, at the minimum, in a deposition allowing the accused to face the witness, assist his counsel, and participate in the questioning through his
counsel. /d. at 821.

See also State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.2d 308, 415
N.E.2d 261 (1980); Criminal Defendant Has Sixth
Amendment Right to Physically Confr..ont Witness
at Video- Taped Deposition, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q.
1106.
Waiver
The right to be present at trial may be waived,
either expressly or by conduct. In Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a
defendant who disrupts a trial, making it "difficult
or wholly impossible to carry on the trial," may be
excluded, after warning, from the courtroom. Similarly, in Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court
held that a defendant who voluntarily absented
himself from his trial during a recess had waived
his right to be present. See also Diaz v. U.S., 223
u.s. 442 (1912).
In Taylor the defendant argued that a voluntary
absence cannot be construed as an effective waiver because it was not "an intentional relinquish-

In the circumstances of this case, [the defendant's] inability to cross-examine [the witness] as to the alleged
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause .... Although the Solicitor's reading of [the witness'] alleged
statement, and [the witness'] refusal to answer, were
not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may
well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of
testimony that [the witness] in fact made the statement. .. /d. at 419.

See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583
(1982).
A similar denial of cross-examination is found in
joint trials in which one defendant's confession
implicating a codefendant is admitted. Although
2

legitimacy of the state's protective policy concerning juveniles, the Court found that the "State's
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective
cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."
/d. at 320.
The Court had addressed similar issues in two
earlier cases. In Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129
(1968), the defense was precluded from eliciting
the true name and address of the prosecution's
"principal witness" during cross-examination. The
Court held that this limitation on cross-examination deprived the defendant of the right of confrontation. "To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry
at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the
right of cross-examination itself." /d. at 131. In
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on
Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931), decided almost
forty years earlier. As in Smith, the defense in
Alford was not permitted to examine a government
witness about the witness' current residence. The
Court held that this curtailment of cross-examination, which would have apparently established
that the witness was in federal custody, was an
abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.
See also State v. Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42, 46,
381 N.E.2d 934, 936 (1978) ("a defendant must have
the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses
against him as a matter of right ... ");State v.
Hannah, 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 374 N.E.2d 1359,
1362 (1978) ("Any abrogation of the defendant's
right to a full and complete cross-examination of
such witnesses is a denial of a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial and is prejudicial per se.");
State v. Gavin, 51 Ohio App.2d 49, 365 N.E.2d 1263
(1977).
Fifth Amendment Limitations
Cross-examination may be limited or completely
cut off if a prosecution witness asserts the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Under these curcuinstances, the defendant's right
of confrontation conflicts with the witness' Fifth
Amendment right. If the asseriion of the privilege
"precludes inquiry into the details of [the witness']
direct testimony, there may be a substantial danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived
of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony
and, therefore, that witness' testimony should be
struck in whole or in part." U.S. v. Cardillo, 316
F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963); accord, U.S. v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029,
1031 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139,
145-46 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Douglas v. Alabama,
380 u.s. 415 (1965).
Striking the direct examination, however, is not
automatic. The courts have recognized a distinction between "direct" and "collateral" matters.

the codefendant would be entitled to an instruction cautioning the jury to use the confession only
in establishing the guilt of the defendant who
made the confession, the Supreme Court has held
that such an instruction is ineffective, and conse,- quently, the non-confessing defendant's right of
confrontation is denied - at least, where the confessing defendant does not take the stand. Bruton
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
U.S. 622 (1971); but see, Parker v. Randolph, 442
U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion) (interlocking confessions). See infra.
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), illustrates
another way in which a defendant's right of crossexamination may be denied. In Parker a bailiff
assigned to a sequestered jury told one juror "Oh
that wicked fellow, he is guilty" and another juror
"[i]f anything is wrong (in finding petitioner guilty)
the Supreme Court will correct it." /d. at 363-64.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of
the right of confrontation.
These cases can also be viewed as "hearsay"
cases because they involve extrajudicial statements that the jury probably used for the truth of
the assertions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
often relied on these cases in deciding hearsayconfrontation issues. On the other hand, these
cases can also be viewed as "nonevidence" cases,
situations in which the jury may have decided the
case on evidence that was not admitted at trial.
See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another
~One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99 (1972).
· Curtailment of Cross-Examination
Cases recognizing a trial court's discretion in
controlling the scope of cross-examination are
common. E.g., O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d
159, 163, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1980) ("The scope of
cross-examination and the admissibility of evidence during cross-examination are matters which
rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge.");
State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 214, 378 N.E.2d
1049, 1052 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979)
("The trial judge is posited with broad discretion in
controlling cross-examination .... ")
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in
which the Supreme Court has ruled that a defense
counsel's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses had been unconstitutionally curtailed. The
leading case is Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
Because of a state statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications, the defense in
Davis was not permitted to elicit information about
a key government witness' juvenile probationary
status during cross-examination. According io ihe
defense, the witness' probationary status raised
the possibility of bias; that is, the witness was
"subject to undue pressure from the police and
made his identifications[of the defendant] under
jJear of possible probation revocation." /d. at 311.
"In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the
,Court held that this restriction on the scope of
cross-examination violated the defendant's right of
Confrontation. Although the Court recognized the

In determining whether the testimony of a witness
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
during cross-examination may be used against the
defendant, a distinction must be drawn between
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely
precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear
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only on the credibility of the witness and those cases
in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry
into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).

dant's right to cross-examine the alleged victim
and limit the admissibility of exculpatory evidence,
a number of commentators have questioned the
constitutionality of shield provisions-at least as
applied in some circumstances. See Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 52-69 (1977);
Westen, Compulsory Process 1/, 74 Mich. L. Rev.
191, 208-213 (1975). Indeed, the federal shield statute explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of
evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity may be
"constitutionally required," Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1).
Constitutional attacks on the rcipe shield statutes center on two Supreme Court cases. One is
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). As discussed
above, the Court in Davis held that a statute excluding evidence of a prosecution witness' juvenile
adjudication (a type of shield law) violated the defendant's right of confrontation.
The second Supreme Court case is Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the defendant was charged with the murder of a policeman. Another person, named McDonald, signed a
statement admitting that it was he, not Chambers,
who fired the fatal shots. McDonald made the
same admission to three other persons. At a preliminary examination McDonald recanted, testifying that he had been pressured into signing the
statement. McDonald was called by the defense at
Chambers' trial and his out-of-court confession
was introduced on direct examination. On crossexamination, the prosecution elicited the fact that
McDonald had recanted. On redirect examination,
the defense wanted to cross-examine McDonald as
an adverse witness. The trial court refused to declare him as adverse witness. The court also ruled
that the defense could not introduce McDonald's
incriminating statements made to the three other
persons. The court's rulings were based upon two
evidentiary rules:. the voucher rule, which precludes a party from impeaching its own witnesses,
and the hearsay rule, which did not recognize an
exception for declarations against penal interests.
As the Court put it "In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a consequence of the combination of Mississippi's 'party witness' or 'voucher rule' and its hearsay rule, he was unable to
either cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his
complicity." /d. at 294. The Court reversed, finding
a due process violation. Part of the Court's opinion
rested on a confrontation analysis- that the
state's voucher rule precluded Chambers from
effectively cross-examining McDonald. Thus, like
Davis v. Alaska, Chambers can be viewed as a
case in which the Confrontation Clause prevailed
over a conflicting state evidentiary rule.
Despite these constitutional arguments, shield
laws generally have been upheld. See Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Pratt v. Parratt,
615 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1980); Rozell v. Estelle,
554 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1977); 23 C. Wright & K.

Accord, U.S. v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 701-02 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980); Turner v.
Fair, 617 F.2d 7, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1980). See also 3 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 338
(1979); Anno., 55 A.L.R. Fed. 742 (1981).
The direct-collateral dichotomy, however, is an
"often tenuous distinction." 3 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 611-54 (1981). As one
court has noted:
But the line between "direct" and "collateral" is not
clear, and the question in each case must finally be
whether defendant's inability to make the inquiry
created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving
him of the ability to test the truth of the witness'
direct testimony. Fountain v. U.S., 384 F.2d 624, 628
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Marshall v. U.S. 390
U.S. 1005 (1968).

Davis v. Alaska would seem to preclude the
possibility of equating "collateral" matters with
matters of credibility because Davis involved impeachment by bias, a matter of credibility. See
U.S. v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub. nom. Antone v. U.S., 445 U.S. 946
(1980) (bias not a collateral matter).
Another solution to the conflict between the
defendant's right of confrontation and the witness'
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is
the immunization of the witness. See Note, "The
Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1228-30 (1978). There is
some judicial support for requiring immunity in situations in which a witness' Fifth Amendment
claim interferes with an accused's ability to defend. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d
1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 891 (1974). See generally
Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 1266 (1978); Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 377 (1980).
Rape Shield Laws
In recent years, most jurisdictions have adopted
rape shield laws. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 592-602 (1980) (listing 46 jurisdictions). The purpose of these provisions is to protect the privacy of rape victims. This goal is
accomplished by altering the common law rule
which permitted the accused to introduce evidence
of the victim's character for chastity on the issue
of consent. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St.
332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858.)
Instead of permitting the automatic admission of
such evidence, shield laws place both substantive
and procedural limitations on the admissibility of
evidence of a victim's prior sexual history.
Because these provisions may curtail a defen4

Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935 (1978).

Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 571 n. 53
(1980) (listing cases). Nevertheless, most commentators believe that "exclusion may violate the
defendant's constitutional rights as applied in par-- ticular circumstances." !d. at 572. For example, in
'
State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337
(1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio rape shield statute as applied to that case. In a footnote, however, the
Court noted: "We hasten to stress that our holding
is limited to the particular application of R.C.
2907.02(D) to the facts in this case. Whether the
statute could conceivably be applied so as to exclude arguably relevant evidence, we cannot now
determine." !d. at 19 n. 2.
A few courts have found a constitutional violation where evidence of the alleged victim's prior
sexual history has been excluded. For example, in
State v. Delawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446
(1975), the defense's theory was that the alleged
victfm, a young teenager, fabricated her testimony
about having intercourse with the defendant because she believed that she was pregnant and was
afraid to inform her mother of this fact. The court,
applying Davis v. Alaska, held that the defendant's
right of confrontation had been denied when the
trial court precluded the defense from introducing
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual history to support this theory. See also State v. Jalo,
27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); People v.
Mandel, 61 App. Div.2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978).

Waiver
In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Supreme Court considered the standard for determining a waiver of the right of confrontation and
cross-examination. In Brookhart the defendant's
counsel agreed to a procedure that is described as
a "prima facie trial;" that is, he "agreed that the
state need make only a prima facie showing of
guilt and that he would neither offer evidence on
petitioner's behalf nor cross-examine any State's
witnesses." !d. at 7. The record indicated that the
defendant did not fully comprehend what a "prima
facie trial" entailed. In reversing, the Supreme
Court wrote:
The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question
controlled by federal law. There is a presumption
against the waiver of constiutional rights ... and for a
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established
that there was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 .... /d. at 4.

The Court went on to find that the defendant
neither personally waived his constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, nor acquiesced in his lawyer's attempted waiver. The waiver standard adopted in
Brookhart is a more stringent standard than the
one adopted by the Court in the "right to be present"
cases. See supra.

Other Privileges
Whether the right of confrontation may override
other state evidentiary privileges is a matter of
debate. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair
Trial, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1173 (1980); Westen, Reflections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege
and Fair Trial," 14 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 372 (1981).
Again, Davis v. Alaska, in which the Court held
that the defendant's right of confrontation prevailed over the privilege of confidentiality of juvenile
court records, is the critical case. Moreover, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), co,ntains dictum indicating that the Sixth Amendment, under
some circumstances, overrides executive privilege.
!d. at 711.
In several cases courts have held that the right
of confrontation prevails over conflicting statutory
privileges. For example, in Salazar v. State, 559
P.2d 66 (Alas. 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the right of confrontation overrode the
privilege for confidential communications between
husband and wife. Similarly, in State v. Hembd,
305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court held the right of confrontation
prevailed over the physician-patient privilege. See
also People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc.2d 55, 347
N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Sixth Amendment
Prevails over confidentiality of state agency's personnel files.); Note, Constitutional Restraints on
the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich.
L. Rev. 1465 (1975); Note, Defendant v. Witness:
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process

BRUTON V. UNITED STATES

Because the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving "Bruton" issues, this subject is treated separately in this section. In Bruton
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court considered
the admissibility in a joint trial of the confession
of one defendant that inculpated another defendant. In such a situation, the non-confessing defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction, cautioning the jury to use the confession in determining only the guilt of the confessing party. Prior to
Bruton, the Court had held that such an instruction
was adequate to protect the non-confessing codefendant. Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In
Bruton, however, the Court held that the limiting
instruction was not sufficient. According to the
Court,
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial. 391 U.S. at
135-36.

Once the Court concluded that there existed a
"substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the petitioner's
guilt," it held that the admission of the nontestify5

ing codefendant's "confession in this joint trial
violated petitioner's right of cross-examination
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment." /d. at 126.
In subsequent decisions, the Court held Bruton
applicable to state trials, Roberts v. Russell, 392
U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the harmless error
doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972);
Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See also State v.
Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980).

position that Bruton was not applicable to cases
involving interlocking confessions. Only four Justices, however, joined in that position. Justice
Blackmun concurred on harmless error grounds
and Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. The lower courts have split on the issue. See
id. at 68 n. 4 (listing cases).
Bruton could apply, however, to statements
made by a codefendant in a pro se argument to a
jury. U.S. v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977).
Avoiding the Bruton Issue
There are several ways in which the Bruton
issue may be obviated. Separate trials avoid the
problem raised in Bruton because the codefendant's confession would be inadmissible hearsay in
the trial of the non-confessing defendant. Frequently, a motion to sever is based on this ground.
See generally State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150,
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); 8 Moore's Federal Practice
ch. 14 (1978); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. 14 (1980).
Another way to avoid the Bruton issue is to
delete or redact all references in the confession
that relate to the codefendant. The Bruton Court
recognized this possibility. See 391 U.S. at 134
n.10. See also State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339,
342, 86 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1949). This procedure is not
effective in many cases "since other testimony in
the case may lead any juror inevitably to the conclusion that omitted names in the statement can
only be the names of other codefendants sitting at
the defense table." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
Federal Evidence 337 (1977). See also Parker v.
Randolph, 422 U.S. 62, 67 n. 3 (1979); Hodges v.
Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
909 (1978). Thus, the California Supreme Court has
remarked: "By effective deletions, we mean not
only direct and indirect identifications of codefendants but any statements that could be employed against nondeclarant codefendants once their
identity is otherwise established." People v.
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518, 530, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47
Cal. Rptr. 353, 361 (1965). In addition, "the confessing defendant may himself object to redaction, invoking the 'rule of completeness' and urging that
deletions from his statement as read or presented
to the jury distort the meaning of the portion offered in evidence." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
supra, at 337-38.
Another remedy for avoiding Bruton is the empaneling of two juries, with only the appropriate
jury present at the time the codefendant's confession is received. See U.S. v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271,
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685,
690 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. noin. Jackson v.
U.S., 423 U.S. 949 (1975); U.S. v. Sidman, 470 F.2d
1158, 1167-70 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1127 (1973).
See generally 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure§ 5064 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~105[04]
(1981); Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Codefendants Confessions: The Drift from Bruton to
Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U.lll. L.F. 559.

Applicability of Bruton
There are a number of situations in which
Bruton does not apply. First, Bruton applies only
when the codefendant's confession is not admissible against the non-confessing defendant. In a
footnote in Bruton the Court pointed out this
limitation: "We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence
.... There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." /d. at 128 n.
3. Thus, if the confession falls within a recognized
hearsay exception, such as the coconspirator exception, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Ohio R. Evid.
801(D)(2)(e), Bruton would not apply. In such a case
the confrontation issue is analyzed under a different standard. See infra (hearsay).
Second, the Bruton rationale would not appear
to apply to bench trials. See U.S. v. Pinkney, 611
F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless,
if in a bench trial the court does, in fact, use the
confession in determining the guilt of the non-confessing defendant, Bruton applies. See U.S. v.
· Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1979).
Third, if the codefendant testifies at trial, Bruton
does not apply. In Bruton the codefendant did not
testify. See 391 U.S. 136 ("The unreliability of such
evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and
cannot be tested by cross-examination."). If the codefendant testifies, however, the defendant has
the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant,
thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The
Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E. 2d 960 (1978). The
Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both defendants are represented by the same attorney because in such a case cross-examination of the testifying codefendant would present a conflict of interests. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F.2d 1108 (9th
Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th
Cir. 1972).
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that
Bruton is inapplicable when both defendants have
confessed, implicating each other ("interlocking
confessions."). The Court considered, but did not
resolve, this issue in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S.
62 (1979). The plurality opinion in Parker took the
6
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The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." This clause was held binding upon the
states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In
addition, the right of confrontation is recognized in
virtually all state constitutions. See 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (listing
authorities). For example, the Ohio Constitution
provides: "In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person ... [and] to meet the witnesses face to
face .... " The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has
shown no inclination to interpret the Ohio provision so as to afford greater confrontation protection than that required by the Sixth Amendment.
See State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d
1122 (1981); State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322,
415 N.E.2d 272 (1980).
The U.S. Supreme Court has underscored the importance of the Confrontation Clause on numerous
occasions. In an early case, Kirby v. U.S., 174 U.S.
47 (1899), the Court referred to the confrontation
clause as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of
life and liberty ... long deemed so essential for
the due protection of life and liberty that it is
guarded against legislative and judicial action by
provisions in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of most if not all the
States composing the Union." /d. at 55-56. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("There
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court
and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an
essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."). Because the right of confrontation is
considered such a fundamental right, it has often
been applied as an element of due process in
noncriminal proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hear-

ings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare
termination hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearings; conditional right of confrontation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearings;
conditional right); Willner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of
admission to bar); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959) (security clearance revocation).
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of
the Confrontation Clause, its scope as well as the
values it seeks to protect remain subject to debate. This result is probably attributable to two
factors. First, as Justice Harlan has pointed out,
"the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause," California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (concurring opinion).
See also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 104 (1972) ("The
historical approach is peculiarly difficult as applied to the Sixth Amendment because a satisfactory history of the right of confrontation has yet to
be written."). Second, the Supreme Court has only
recently ventured into this area. The Court "decided its first confrontation case a century after the
Sixth Amendment was adopted." /d. Moreover, the
Court had little need to develop a comprehensive
view of the right of confrontation prior to 1965,
when the right was first applied to state trials in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Prior to that
time, the Court could resolve most "confrontation"
issues on federal evidentiary grounds.
This article will examine the current status of
the Confrontation Clause. The first part of the article considers the "right to be present," the right of
cross-examination, and Bruton issues. The second
part discusses the relationship between the right
of confrontation and the hearsay rule.
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PRESENCE AT TRIAL

ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." /d. at 19, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). The court rejected this argument, which
would have required a defendant to have been advised in advance of the consequences of absenting himself from trial. According to the Court, "[i]t
is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner ...
entertained any doubts about his right to be present at every stage of his trial." /d. at 20.
Several courts have also found a "waiver" where
the defendant absents himself prtor to trial but after arraignment. See U.S. v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1975). cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v.
U.S., 424 U.S. 925 (1976); U.S. v. Tortora, 464 F.2d
1202 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub. nom., Santora
v. U.S., 409 U.S.1063 (1972).
The right to be present has been codified in Federal Criminal Rule 43 and Ohio Criminal Rule 43.
See generally BB Moore's Federal Practice ch. 43
(1981); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal
Law, Grim. R. 43 (1980). See also R.C. 2945.16
(right to be present at jury view); Grim. R. 15 (right
to be present at deposition).

"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed
by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right
to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970);
accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v.
U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("A leading principle
that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure
is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be
done in the absence of the prisoner."). See also
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 567, 569-74 (1978). Thus, it is a violation of the right of confrontation for the defendant
to be absent during challenges to the jury, lewis v.
U.S., 146 U.S. 370 (1892), during the introduction of
evidence, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 370 (1948), and
when additional jury instructions are given, State
v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87, 19 N.E.2d 645 (1939);
Jones v. State, 26 Ohio St. 208 (1875).
A recent case involving the right to be present is
U.S. v. Benefield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In
Benefield a videotape deposition of the prosecution's principal witness, a kidnap victim, was taken
prior to trial. The deposition was used because the
witness' psychiatrist testified that her "psychiatric
problems were directly related to her abduction.
He recommended that she not be required to testify or that circumstances less stressful than a trial
courtroom be arranged." /d. at 817. The defendant
was excluded from the room in which the deposition was taken, although he did observe the proceedings on a monitor and could interrupt the proceedings by using a buzzer, at which time his
counsel could consult with him. The Eighth Circuit
found this procedure infringed the defendant's
right of confrontation:

RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
In addition to ensuring a defendant's right to be
present, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant the right to cross-examine the "witnesses against him." See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the [Confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.").
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("a denial of
cross-examination without a waiver ... would be
constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would
cure it.").
Denial of Right to Cross-Examine
The Supreme Court has reviewed several cases
in which it has found a complete denial of the
right of cross-examination. For example, in
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the prosecution called a previously-convicted accomplice
as a witness. When the witness refused to testify,
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination,
the prosecutor read the witness' prior confession
which implicated the defendant, under the guise of
refreshing the witness' recollection. The Supreme
Court reversed.

Basically the confrontation clause contemplates the
active participation of the accused at all stages of the
trial, including the face-to-face meeting with the witness at trial or, at the minimum, in a deposition allowing the accused to face the witness, assist his counsel, and participate in the questioning through his
counsel. /d. at 821.

See also State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.2d 308, 415
N.E.2d 261 (1980); Criminal Defendant Has Sixth
Amendment Right to Physically Confr..ont Witness
at Video- Taped Deposition, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q.
1106.
Waiver
The right to be present at trial may be waived,
either expressly or by conduct. In Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a
defendant who disrupts a trial, making it "difficult
or wholly impossible to carry on the trial," may be
excluded, after warning, from the courtroom. Similarly, in Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court
held that a defendant who voluntarily absented
himself from his trial during a recess had waived
his right to be present. See also Diaz v. U.S., 223
u.s. 442 (1912).
In Taylor the defendant argued that a voluntary
absence cannot be construed as an effective waiver because it was not "an intentional relinquish-

In the circumstances of this case, [the defendant's] inability to cross-examine [the witness] as to the alleged
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause .... Although the Solicitor's reading of [the witness'] alleged
statement, and [the witness'] refusal to answer, were
not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may
well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of
testimony that [the witness] in fact made the statement. .. /d. at 419.

See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583
(1982).
A similar denial of cross-examination is found in
joint trials in which one defendant's confession
implicating a codefendant is admitted. Although
2

legitimacy of the state's protective policy concerning juveniles, the Court found that the "State's
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective
cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."
/d. at 320.
The Court had addressed similar issues in two
earlier cases. In Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129
(1968), the defense was precluded from eliciting
the true name and address of the prosecution's
"principal witness" during cross-examination. The
Court held that this limitation on cross-examination deprived the defendant of the right of confrontation. "To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry
at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the
right of cross-examination itself." /d. at 131. In
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on
Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931), decided almost
forty years earlier. As in Smith, the defense in
Alford was not permitted to examine a government
witness about the witness' current residence. The
Court held that this curtailment of cross-examination, which would have apparently established
that the witness was in federal custody, was an
abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.
See also State v. Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42, 46,
381 N.E.2d 934, 936 (1978) ("a defendant must have
the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses
against him as a matter of right ... ");State v.
Hannah, 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 374 N.E.2d 1359,
1362 (1978) ("Any abrogation of the defendant's
right to a full and complete cross-examination of
such witnesses is a denial of a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial and is prejudicial per se.");
State v. Gavin, 51 Ohio App.2d 49, 365 N.E.2d 1263
(1977).
Fifth Amendment Limitations
Cross-examination may be limited or completely
cut off if a prosecution witness asserts the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Under these curcuinstances, the defendant's right
of confrontation conflicts with the witness' Fifth
Amendment right. If the asseriion of the privilege
"precludes inquiry into the details of [the witness']
direct testimony, there may be a substantial danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived
of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony
and, therefore, that witness' testimony should be
struck in whole or in part." U.S. v. Cardillo, 316
F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963); accord, U.S. v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029,
1031 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139,
145-46 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Douglas v. Alabama,
380 u.s. 415 (1965).
Striking the direct examination, however, is not
automatic. The courts have recognized a distinction between "direct" and "collateral" matters.

the codefendant would be entitled to an instruction cautioning the jury to use the confession only
in establishing the guilt of the defendant who
made the confession, the Supreme Court has held
that such an instruction is ineffective, and conse,- quently, the non-confessing defendant's right of
confrontation is denied - at least, where the confessing defendant does not take the stand. Bruton
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
U.S. 622 (1971); but see, Parker v. Randolph, 442
U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion) (interlocking confessions). See infra.
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), illustrates
another way in which a defendant's right of crossexamination may be denied. In Parker a bailiff
assigned to a sequestered jury told one juror "Oh
that wicked fellow, he is guilty" and another juror
"[i]f anything is wrong (in finding petitioner guilty)
the Supreme Court will correct it." /d. at 363-64.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of
the right of confrontation.
These cases can also be viewed as "hearsay"
cases because they involve extrajudicial statements that the jury probably used for the truth of
the assertions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
often relied on these cases in deciding hearsayconfrontation issues. On the other hand, these
cases can also be viewed as "nonevidence" cases,
situations in which the jury may have decided the
case on evidence that was not admitted at trial.
See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another
~One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99 (1972).
· Curtailment of Cross-Examination
Cases recognizing a trial court's discretion in
controlling the scope of cross-examination are
common. E.g., O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d
159, 163, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1980) ("The scope of
cross-examination and the admissibility of evidence during cross-examination are matters which
rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge.");
State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 214, 378 N.E.2d
1049, 1052 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979)
("The trial judge is posited with broad discretion in
controlling cross-examination .... ")
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in
which the Supreme Court has ruled that a defense
counsel's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses had been unconstitutionally curtailed. The
leading case is Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
Because of a state statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications, the defense in
Davis was not permitted to elicit information about
a key government witness' juvenile probationary
status during cross-examination. According io ihe
defense, the witness' probationary status raised
the possibility of bias; that is, the witness was
"subject to undue pressure from the police and
made his identifications[of the defendant] under
jJear of possible probation revocation." /d. at 311.
"In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the
,Court held that this restriction on the scope of
cross-examination violated the defendant's right of
Confrontation. Although the Court recognized the

In determining whether the testimony of a witness
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
during cross-examination may be used against the
defendant, a distinction must be drawn between
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely
precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear
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only on the credibility of the witness and those cases
in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry
into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).

dant's right to cross-examine the alleged victim
and limit the admissibility of exculpatory evidence,
a number of commentators have questioned the
constitutionality of shield provisions-at least as
applied in some circumstances. See Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 52-69 (1977);
Westen, Compulsory Process 1/, 74 Mich. L. Rev.
191, 208-213 (1975). Indeed, the federal shield statute explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of
evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity may be
"constitutionally required," Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1).
Constitutional attacks on the rcipe shield statutes center on two Supreme Court cases. One is
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). As discussed
above, the Court in Davis held that a statute excluding evidence of a prosecution witness' juvenile
adjudication (a type of shield law) violated the defendant's right of confrontation.
The second Supreme Court case is Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the defendant was charged with the murder of a policeman. Another person, named McDonald, signed a
statement admitting that it was he, not Chambers,
who fired the fatal shots. McDonald made the
same admission to three other persons. At a preliminary examination McDonald recanted, testifying that he had been pressured into signing the
statement. McDonald was called by the defense at
Chambers' trial and his out-of-court confession
was introduced on direct examination. On crossexamination, the prosecution elicited the fact that
McDonald had recanted. On redirect examination,
the defense wanted to cross-examine McDonald as
an adverse witness. The trial court refused to declare him as adverse witness. The court also ruled
that the defense could not introduce McDonald's
incriminating statements made to the three other
persons. The court's rulings were based upon two
evidentiary rules:. the voucher rule, which precludes a party from impeaching its own witnesses,
and the hearsay rule, which did not recognize an
exception for declarations against penal interests.
As the Court put it "In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a consequence of the combination of Mississippi's 'party witness' or 'voucher rule' and its hearsay rule, he was unable to
either cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his
complicity." /d. at 294. The Court reversed, finding
a due process violation. Part of the Court's opinion
rested on a confrontation analysis- that the
state's voucher rule precluded Chambers from
effectively cross-examining McDonald. Thus, like
Davis v. Alaska, Chambers can be viewed as a
case in which the Confrontation Clause prevailed
over a conflicting state evidentiary rule.
Despite these constitutional arguments, shield
laws generally have been upheld. See Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Pratt v. Parratt,
615 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1980); Rozell v. Estelle,
554 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1977); 23 C. Wright & K.

Accord, U.S. v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 701-02 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980); Turner v.
Fair, 617 F.2d 7, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1980). See also 3 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 338
(1979); Anno., 55 A.L.R. Fed. 742 (1981).
The direct-collateral dichotomy, however, is an
"often tenuous distinction." 3 J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 611-54 (1981). As one
court has noted:
But the line between "direct" and "collateral" is not
clear, and the question in each case must finally be
whether defendant's inability to make the inquiry
created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving
him of the ability to test the truth of the witness'
direct testimony. Fountain v. U.S., 384 F.2d 624, 628
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Marshall v. U.S. 390
U.S. 1005 (1968).

Davis v. Alaska would seem to preclude the
possibility of equating "collateral" matters with
matters of credibility because Davis involved impeachment by bias, a matter of credibility. See
U.S. v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub. nom. Antone v. U.S., 445 U.S. 946
(1980) (bias not a collateral matter).
Another solution to the conflict between the
defendant's right of confrontation and the witness'
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is
the immunization of the witness. See Note, "The
Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1228-30 (1978). There is
some judicial support for requiring immunity in situations in which a witness' Fifth Amendment
claim interferes with an accused's ability to defend. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d
1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 891 (1974). See generally
Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 1266 (1978); Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 377 (1980).
Rape Shield Laws
In recent years, most jurisdictions have adopted
rape shield laws. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 592-602 (1980) (listing 46 jurisdictions). The purpose of these provisions is to protect the privacy of rape victims. This goal is
accomplished by altering the common law rule
which permitted the accused to introduce evidence
of the victim's character for chastity on the issue
of consent. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St.
332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858.)
Instead of permitting the automatic admission of
such evidence, shield laws place both substantive
and procedural limitations on the admissibility of
evidence of a victim's prior sexual history.
Because these provisions may curtail a defen4

Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935 (1978).

Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 571 n. 53
(1980) (listing cases). Nevertheless, most commentators believe that "exclusion may violate the
defendant's constitutional rights as applied in par-- ticular circumstances." !d. at 572. For example, in
'
State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337
(1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio rape shield statute as applied to that case. In a footnote, however, the
Court noted: "We hasten to stress that our holding
is limited to the particular application of R.C.
2907.02(D) to the facts in this case. Whether the
statute could conceivably be applied so as to exclude arguably relevant evidence, we cannot now
determine." !d. at 19 n. 2.
A few courts have found a constitutional violation where evidence of the alleged victim's prior
sexual history has been excluded. For example, in
State v. Delawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446
(1975), the defense's theory was that the alleged
victfm, a young teenager, fabricated her testimony
about having intercourse with the defendant because she believed that she was pregnant and was
afraid to inform her mother of this fact. The court,
applying Davis v. Alaska, held that the defendant's
right of confrontation had been denied when the
trial court precluded the defense from introducing
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual history to support this theory. See also State v. Jalo,
27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); People v.
Mandel, 61 App. Div.2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978).

Waiver
In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Supreme Court considered the standard for determining a waiver of the right of confrontation and
cross-examination. In Brookhart the defendant's
counsel agreed to a procedure that is described as
a "prima facie trial;" that is, he "agreed that the
state need make only a prima facie showing of
guilt and that he would neither offer evidence on
petitioner's behalf nor cross-examine any State's
witnesses." !d. at 7. The record indicated that the
defendant did not fully comprehend what a "prima
facie trial" entailed. In reversing, the Supreme
Court wrote:
The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question
controlled by federal law. There is a presumption
against the waiver of constiutional rights ... and for a
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established
that there was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 .... /d. at 4.

The Court went on to find that the defendant
neither personally waived his constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, nor acquiesced in his lawyer's attempted waiver. The waiver standard adopted in
Brookhart is a more stringent standard than the
one adopted by the Court in the "right to be present"
cases. See supra.

Other Privileges
Whether the right of confrontation may override
other state evidentiary privileges is a matter of
debate. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair
Trial, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1173 (1980); Westen, Reflections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege
and Fair Trial," 14 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 372 (1981).
Again, Davis v. Alaska, in which the Court held
that the defendant's right of confrontation prevailed over the privilege of confidentiality of juvenile
court records, is the critical case. Moreover, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), co,ntains dictum indicating that the Sixth Amendment, under
some circumstances, overrides executive privilege.
!d. at 711.
In several cases courts have held that the right
of confrontation prevails over conflicting statutory
privileges. For example, in Salazar v. State, 559
P.2d 66 (Alas. 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the right of confrontation overrode the
privilege for confidential communications between
husband and wife. Similarly, in State v. Hembd,
305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court held the right of confrontation
prevailed over the physician-patient privilege. See
also People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc.2d 55, 347
N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Sixth Amendment
Prevails over confidentiality of state agency's personnel files.); Note, Constitutional Restraints on
the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich.
L. Rev. 1465 (1975); Note, Defendant v. Witness:
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process

BRUTON V. UNITED STATES

Because the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving "Bruton" issues, this subject is treated separately in this section. In Bruton
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court considered
the admissibility in a joint trial of the confession
of one defendant that inculpated another defendant. In such a situation, the non-confessing defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction, cautioning the jury to use the confession in determining only the guilt of the confessing party. Prior to
Bruton, the Court had held that such an instruction
was adequate to protect the non-confessing codefendant. Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In
Bruton, however, the Court held that the limiting
instruction was not sufficient. According to the
Court,
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial. 391 U.S. at
135-36.

Once the Court concluded that there existed a
"substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the petitioner's
guilt," it held that the admission of the nontestify5

ing codefendant's "confession in this joint trial
violated petitioner's right of cross-examination
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment." /d. at 126.
In subsequent decisions, the Court held Bruton
applicable to state trials, Roberts v. Russell, 392
U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the harmless error
doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972);
Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See also State v.
Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980).

position that Bruton was not applicable to cases
involving interlocking confessions. Only four Justices, however, joined in that position. Justice
Blackmun concurred on harmless error grounds
and Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. The lower courts have split on the issue. See
id. at 68 n. 4 (listing cases).
Bruton could apply, however, to statements
made by a codefendant in a pro se argument to a
jury. U.S. v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977).
Avoiding the Bruton Issue
There are several ways in which the Bruton
issue may be obviated. Separate trials avoid the
problem raised in Bruton because the codefendant's confession would be inadmissible hearsay in
the trial of the non-confessing defendant. Frequently, a motion to sever is based on this ground.
See generally State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150,
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); 8 Moore's Federal Practice
ch. 14 (1978); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. 14 (1980).
Another way to avoid the Bruton issue is to
delete or redact all references in the confession
that relate to the codefendant. The Bruton Court
recognized this possibility. See 391 U.S. at 134
n.10. See also State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339,
342, 86 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1949). This procedure is not
effective in many cases "since other testimony in
the case may lead any juror inevitably to the conclusion that omitted names in the statement can
only be the names of other codefendants sitting at
the defense table." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
Federal Evidence 337 (1977). See also Parker v.
Randolph, 422 U.S. 62, 67 n. 3 (1979); Hodges v.
Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
909 (1978). Thus, the California Supreme Court has
remarked: "By effective deletions, we mean not
only direct and indirect identifications of codefendants but any statements that could be employed against nondeclarant codefendants once their
identity is otherwise established." People v.
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518, 530, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47
Cal. Rptr. 353, 361 (1965). In addition, "the confessing defendant may himself object to redaction, invoking the 'rule of completeness' and urging that
deletions from his statement as read or presented
to the jury distort the meaning of the portion offered in evidence." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller,
supra, at 337-38.
Another remedy for avoiding Bruton is the empaneling of two juries, with only the appropriate
jury present at the time the codefendant's confession is received. See U.S. v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271,
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685,
690 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. noin. Jackson v.
U.S., 423 U.S. 949 (1975); U.S. v. Sidman, 470 F.2d
1158, 1167-70 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1127 (1973).
See generally 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure§ 5064 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~105[04]
(1981); Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Codefendants Confessions: The Drift from Bruton to
Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U.lll. L.F. 559.

Applicability of Bruton
There are a number of situations in which
Bruton does not apply. First, Bruton applies only
when the codefendant's confession is not admissible against the non-confessing defendant. In a
footnote in Bruton the Court pointed out this
limitation: "We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence
.... There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." /d. at 128 n.
3. Thus, if the confession falls within a recognized
hearsay exception, such as the coconspirator exception, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Ohio R. Evid.
801(D)(2)(e), Bruton would not apply. In such a case
the confrontation issue is analyzed under a different standard. See infra (hearsay).
Second, the Bruton rationale would not appear
to apply to bench trials. See U.S. v. Pinkney, 611
F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless,
if in a bench trial the court does, in fact, use the
confession in determining the guilt of the non-confessing defendant, Bruton applies. See U.S. v.
· Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1979).
Third, if the codefendant testifies at trial, Bruton
does not apply. In Bruton the codefendant did not
testify. See 391 U.S. 136 ("The unreliability of such
evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and
cannot be tested by cross-examination."). If the codefendant testifies, however, the defendant has
the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant,
thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The
Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E. 2d 960 (1978). The
Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both defendants are represented by the same attorney because in such a case cross-examination of the testifying codefendant would present a conflict of interests. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F.2d 1108 (9th
Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th
Cir. 1972).
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that
Bruton is inapplicable when both defendants have
confessed, implicating each other ("interlocking
confessions."). The Court considered, but did not
resolve, this issue in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S.
62 (1979). The plurality opinion in Parker took the
6

